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The ‘No Surplusage’ Canon
In State and Local Tax Cases
by Steve R. Johnson
Previous installments
of this column have exam-
ined numerous canons or
conventions of statutory
interpretation in their ap-
plication to state and local
tax controversies. This in-
stallment considers an-
other canon: the precept
that courts should prefer
interpretations that ren-
der no part of a statute
superfluous. A recent
treatise phrased the prin-
ciple thus:
If possible, every word and every provision [of
an enactment] is to be given effect. . . . None
should be ignored. None should needlessly be
given an interpretation that causes it to dupli-
cate another provision or to have no conse-
quence.1
The first part below describes the canon gener-
ally. The second part identifies the reasons advanced
for the precept, the objections lodged against it, and
the limitations on it. The third part gives examples
of the canon in state and local tax cases, both cases
in which its assertion was successful and cases in
which its use failed.
The Canon Generally
This principle of statutory construction is of an-
cient vintage, so much so that it once was known by
its Latin styling ‘‘verba cum effectu sunt accipi-
enda.’’2 The principle was recognized by leading
figures in American law, such as Chief Justice John
Marshall and Judge Thomas M. Cooley, from early
in our legal history.3
The U.S. Supreme Court has applied the rule in
numerous cases involving the construction of both
tax4 and nontax5 statutes. The Court has called it
‘‘one of the most basic interpretive canons’’6 and a
‘‘cardinal rule of statutory interpretation.’’7
The canon figured in two tax cases decided by the
Supreme Court in its most recent term. In United
States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, the Court
reaffirmed an earlier decision holding that the six-
year limitations period on assessment does not ap-
ply to situations in which the taxpayer overstated
her basis in property. The government argued that a
later statutory change had eroded the earlier deci-
sion. The Court rejected that argument. The Court
noted the ‘‘canon that statutes should be read to
avoid making any provision ‘superfluous, void, or
insignificant,’’’ but observed that its interpretation
did not leave the amended provision ‘‘without work
to do.’’8
Later, in National Fed. of Independent Bus. v.
Sebelius (the healthcare case), the canon appeared
1Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (2012).
2‘‘Words are to be taken as having an effect.’’ Ulpian,
Digesta 2.7.5.2 (third century A.D. Roman jurist).
3Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 202 (1819) (per
Marshall, C.J.); Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Consti-
tutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power
of the States of the American Union 58 (1868); see also Market
Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112, 115-116 (1879).
4E.g., Hall v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1882, 1890 (2012);
Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004).
5E.g., New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635,
2640 (2010); Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 207 n.53 (1985);
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979).
6Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314-315 (2009).
7Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988) (plu-
rality op.); see also Fortec Constructors v. United States, 760
F.2d 1288, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (describing the canon as a
‘‘well accepted and basic principle’’).
8United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct.
1836, 1841-1842 (2012) (quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534
U.S. 19, 31 (2001)).
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in two contexts. First, a threshold question was
whether on-the-merits review of the constitutional-
ity of the legislation was precluded by the federal
Anti-Injunction Act.9 One argument in favor of pre-
clusion was that the applicable legislation provided
that the shared responsibility payment that en-
forced the mandate that individuals buy medical
insurance ‘‘shall be assessed and collected in the
same manner as’’ specific assessable penalties,
which in turn are ‘‘assessed and collected in the
same manner as taxes.’’10 The Court unanimously
rejected that argument, in part on the basis of the
‘‘no surplusage’’ canon.11
Second, a majority of the Court rejected the
contention that the commerce clause of the U.S.
Constitution gives Congress the power to compel
individuals to buy medical insurance. Chief Justice
John Roberts emphasized that this clause allows
Congress to ‘‘regulate Commerce,’’ adding: ‘‘The
power to regulate commerce presupposes the exist-
ence of commercial activity to be regulated. If the
power to ‘regulate’ something included the power to
create it, many of the provisions of the Constitution
would be superfluous.’’12
The no surplusage principle also has featured in
countless state cases.13 Those include tax cases14 as
well as nontax cases.15 In most instances, the prin-
ciple is of judicial inspiration. In some jurisdictions,
however, it is enacted in a statutory provision.16
Rationales, Objections, and Limits
As we have seen in previous installments, some
canons are linguistic in nature in that they use
common characteristics of expression as lenses
through which to discern the meaning the legisla-
ture was attempting to convey through the statute it
wrote. Other canons are substantive in that they
seek to protect established values or preserve legiti-
mate relationships between branches of the govern-
ment.
The no surplusage canon has been explained and
defended in both those regards. Linguistically, the
legislator as speaker ‘‘is presumed to, as in fact he
does, choose his words deliberately intending that
every word shall have a binding effect.’’17 Substan-
tively, textualist judges believe that with few excep-
tions, the role of courts is to apply statutes as they
are written and not to alter them. To those jurists,
‘‘the surplusage canon holds that it is no more the
court’s function to revise by subtraction than addi-
tion.’’18
To textualist jurists, ‘the
surplusage canon holds that it is
no more the court’s function to
revise by subtraction than
addition.’
Neither of those rationales commands universal
support, however. A former colleague of mine has
challenged the reality of the linguistic justification:
Statutes are not always carefully drafted. Le-
gal drafters often include redundant language
on purpose to cover any unforeseen gaps or
simply for no good reason at all. And legislators
are not likely to waste time or energy arguing
to remove redundancy when there are more
important issues to address. Thus, the pre-
sumptions [underlying the canon] simply do
not match political reality.19
Of course, examples of obvious redundancy are
abundant in everyday life. Every airline passenger
can recite the injunction not to ‘‘destroy, disable, or
tamper with’’ the smoke detectors. It would be hard
to destroy or disable an appliance without tamper-
ing with it. Whether for solemnity, emphasis, belt-
and-suspenders caution, or just sloppiness, speakers
often engage in verbal superfluity.
9IRC section 7421(a) (providing that ‘‘no suit for the
purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax
shall be maintained in any court by any person’’).
10IRC sections 5000A(g)(1) and 6671(a).
11National Fed. of Independent Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB),
132 S. Ct. 2566, 2656 (2012) (joint dissent of Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito, JJ.) (noting that other parts of the code
‘‘provided both that a particular payment shall be ‘assessed
and collected’ in the same manner as a tax and that no suit
shall be maintained to restrain the assessment or collection of
the payment. . . . The latter directive would be superfluous if
the former invoked the Anti-Injunction Act.’’) (emphasis in
original).
12Id. at 2586 (emphasis in original).
13See, e.g., Norman J. Singer and J.D. Shambie Singer, 2A
Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction section 46.6
(updated Dec. 2011) (citing cases).
14E.g., Bean Dredging, LLC v. Alabama Dep’t of Revenue,
855 So.2d 513, 517 (Ala. 2003); Montgomery Cty. v. Maryland
Econ. Dev. Corp., 40 A.3d 1066, 1077 (Md. Spec’l App. 2012);
City of Port Huron v. State Tax Comm’n, 2012 WL 933604, at
*3 (Mich. App., Mar. 20, 2012); Marshall v. Commonwealth,
41 A.3d 67, 75 n.14 (Pa. Cmwlth 2012); CFRE, LLC v.
Greenville Cty. Assessor, 716 S.E.2d 877, 881 (S.C. 2011); City
of Houston v. Hotels.com, LP, 357 S.W.3d 706, 711 (Texas App.
2011).
15E.g., People v. Owens, 219 P.3d 379, 382 (Colo. App. Apr.
16, 2009).
16E.g., Minn. Stat. 645.16; Or. Rev. Stat. 174.010; Pa.
Consol. Stat. sections 1921(a) and 1922(2).
17Ernst Freund, ‘‘Interpretation of Statutes,’’ 65 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 207, 218 (1917); see also, United States v. Butler, 297 U.S.
1, 65 (1936); State v. Sweat, 665 S.E.2d 645, 651 (S.C. App.
2008), aff’d, 688 S.E.2d 569 (S.C. 2010).
18Scalia and Garner, supra note 1, at 174.




Regarding the other rationale, not all judges are
disciplined textualists. Thousands of state and fed-
eral cases have endorsed the notion that ‘‘the cardi-
nal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain
and effectuate the intent of the legislature.’’20 For
some judges, that means objective intent to be
discerned from the statute itself. For many others,
however, it is subjective intent to be gleaned from
whatever intrinsic or extrinsic resources may be at
hand.21 Particularly for judges of the second persua-
sion, neither adding to nor subtracting from statu-
tory text is a mortal sin. Thus, ‘‘like all other canons,
this one must be applied with judgment and discre-
tion, and with careful regard to context. It cannot
always be dispositive because (as with most canons)
the underlying proposition is not invariably true.’’22
Accordingly, courts have treated statutory terms as
surplusage under various circumstances, including
when:
• the text, structure, or context reveal a clear
meaning;
• the word was the product of legislative inad-
vertence or a typographical or clerical error;
• excision is necessary to give the statute ‘‘mean-
ing, effect, or intelligibility’’;
• applying all the language would lead to an
absurd or irrational result;
• excision is necessary to harmonize other provi-
sions;
• the words in question ‘‘are entirely foreign to
the subject matter of the enactment’’; or
• it is apparent from the body or the caption of
the statute that the term is surplusage.23
State-Local Tax Examples
To illustrate operation of the no surplusage
canon, we now consider five tax cases. The canon
was significant to the outcome in cases from New
Jersey, Massachusetts, and Louisiana. It was
avoided or overcome in cases from Hawaii and
California.
New Jersey
New Jersey imposes a transfer inheritance tax.
Before Grace Frost died in June 2000, her attorney
embezzled more than $250,000 from her. Her estate
received a compensatory payment in December 2002
on account of the embezzlement. That receipt gen-
erated transfer inheritance tax liability, which was
paid under an amended return. Interest also was
payable to the state for that liability. The question in
the case was whether that interest accrued from
eight months after the date of Grace’s death or two
months after the estate received the compensatory
payment.
The earlier date was the date generally provided
by New Jersey Statute 54:35. The estate argued for
the later date on the ground that post-death settle-
ments are contingent future estates and so fall
within the special rule under New Jersey Statute
54:36-5. In Estate of Frost v. Division of Tax’n, the
court rejected that contention in part because of the
no surplusage principle. The court noted that an-
other statutory exception (enacted after the contin-
gent future estates exception) involved amounts
recovered for the wrongful death of a person. The
court reasoned that accepting the estate’s ‘‘interpre-
tation would render the [later enacted] provision
excluding wrongful death settlements . . . superflu-
ous, as it would already have been covered under the
section regarding contingent future estates.’’24
Massachusetts
The question in Verizon New England Inc. v.
Board of Assessors of Newton involved the power of
local assessors to assess property taxes after deci-
sion by the appellate tax board but before expiration
of the time for appeal of that decision. The taxpayer
denied that this power existed because no final
decision exists before the expiration. The assessors
countered that each decision issued by the board
constitutes a final decision on which assessment
could be based.
The court noted that standing alone, the text of
the relevant decision could credibly support either
party’s position. In part because of our canon, how-
ever, the court held for the taxpayer. The court noted
another statute, stating: ‘‘Upon dismissal of an ap-
peal, the decision of the board shall thereupon have
full force and effect.’’ The court concluded: ‘‘If, as the
[assessors] suggest, the board’s decision were effec-
tive upon its issuance, we would have to conclude
that the last sentence was unnecessary surplusage
20Sloan v. Hardee, 640 S.E.2d 457, 459 (S.C. 2007).
21See Steve R. Johnson, ‘‘The Two Kinds of Legislative
Intent,’’ State Tax Notes, Mar. 30, 2009, p. 1045, Doc 2009-
5906, or 2009 STT 59-3.
22Scalia and Garner, supra note 1, at 176.
23Singer and Singer, supra note 13, section 47:37; see also
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Superior Ct., 137 Cal. App. 4th 842, 858
(2006); In re Estate of Smith, 467 A.2d 1274, 1280 (Del. Chan.
1983).
24Estate of Frost v. Division of Tax’n, 22 N.J. Tax 537, 549
(2005). (For the decision, see Doc 2005-24652 or 2005 STT
239-27.)
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[sic]. That is the kind of conclusion we almost never
reach, . . . and we do not reach it here.’’25
Louisiana
The question in McLane Southern, Inc. v. Bridges
was whether a wholesale dealer of smokeless to-
bacco products was liable for excise tax under Loui-
siana’s Tobacco Tax Law. In 1932 the Legislature
enacted revised statutes 47:85 and 47:841, render-
ing the sale, use, or distribution of tobacco products
taxable, defining tobacco products, and imposing the
tax on dealers. In 2000 the Legislature amended one
of the statutes to add smokeless tobacco to the list of
taxable products, but it did not amend the other
statute. Consequently, the taxpayer maintained, the
law did not define who (dealers or others) is liable
for payment of the tax.
The Louisiana Supreme Court held against the
taxpayer, saying that if it were to accept McLane’s
argument, neither McLane nor anyone else would be
liable for the tax, which would render the Legisla-
ture’s addition of smokeless tobacco to the list of
taxable products meaningless and superfluous ‘‘from
the moment it was enacted.’’26
The court undoubtedly reached the correct result.
However, it blurred the rationale. There is another
canon — more or less separate from the no surplus-
age canon — known as the presumption against
ineffectiveness, that is, that interpretations that
render a statute ineffective are to be avoided.27 The
Louisiana court’s rationale seems to partake more of
the rule against ineffectiveness than the rule
against surplusage.
Hawaii
County of Maui v. KM Hawaii Inc. was a property
tax case involving valuation of the Hyatt Regency
Maui’s property. The taxpayer appealed the county’s
assessment to the state tax appeal court. The tax
appeal court held for the taxpayer. Indeed, it deter-
mined a valuation even lower than that claimed by
the taxpayer in its notice of appeal. The county
appealed the decision, asserting that the court
lacked jurisdiction to award judgment lower than
the valuation the taxpayer claimed in its notice of
appeal. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the
appeal court did have jurisdiction.
The case involved several statutes, one of which
provided that the tax appeal court’s jurisdiction is
limited to the amount of valuation or taxes in
dispute as shown on the one hand by the amount
claimed by the taxpayer and on the other hand by
the amount of the assessment. The supreme court
concluded that this statute did not require a decision
for the county.
Nonetheless, to avoid the no surplusage canon,
the supreme court thought it necessary to find some
work for this statute to do, some manner in which
this statute did limit the lower court’s jurisdiction. It
settled on the following:
We have held that the tax appeal court must
base its conclusions upon evidence adduced.
Accordingly, we hold that ‘‘the amount claimed
by the taxpayer’’ means whatever amount is
supported by evidence presented to [that
court,] and that [the statute] limits the juris-
diction of [that court] to that amount.28
California
In River Garden Retirement Home v. FTB, the
taxpayer claimed dividends received deductions for
franchise tax purposes for tax years 1999 and 2000.
The deduction statute was invalidated in 2003 un-
der the commerce clause because it discriminated in
favor of California corporations. The California
Franchise Tax Board then denied the 1999 and 2000
deductions under a retroactive assessment remedy
provided by a state statute. In relevant part, the
statute permitted retroactive assessments ‘‘if any
deduction, credit or exclusion . . . is finally adjudged
discriminatory against a national banking associa-
tion contrary to [15 U.S.C. section 548] . . . or is for
any reason finally adjudged invalid, or discrimina-
tory under the California Constitution, or the laws
or the Constitution of the United States.’’
The taxpayer maintained that the statute per-
tained only to national banks, and it was not a
national bank. The court properly rejected the tax-
payer’s contention because the statute was written
in the disjunctive, referring to a tax that was dis-
criminatory against national banks under section
548 or was invalid under the California Constitution
or federal statutory or constitutional law. The situa-
tion did not fall into the statutory language before
‘‘or’’ that sets out the condition for national banks,
but it did fall into the statutory language after ‘‘or.’’29
The taxpayer resisted that conclusion on the basis
of the no surplusage canon, maintaining that if the
material after the ‘‘or’’ embraces all taxpayers, ‘‘then
the prior reference to national banking associations
25Verizon New England Inc. v. Board of Assessors of
Newton, 963 N.E.2d 1205, 1209 (2012); review denied, 967
N.E.2d 636 (Mass. 2012). (For the decision, see Doc 2012-5793
or 2012 STT 55-8.)
26McLane Southern, Inc. v. Bridges, 84 So.3d 479, 484 (La.
2012). (For the decision, see Doc 2012-1624 or 2012 STT
18-14.)
27See, e.g., Scalia and Garner, supra note 1, at 63-65.
28County of Maui v. KM Hawaii Inc., 915 P.2d 1349, 1356
(Haw. 1996) (citations and internal punctuation omitted),
reconsideration denied, 917 P.2d 727 (Hawaii 1996).
29River Garden Retirement Home v. FTB, 186 Cal. App. 4th
922, 941 (2010). (For the decision, see Doc 2010-15924 or 2010
STT 137-8.)
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